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Abstract 
Roles of representation are at the core of democracy, providing representative democracy with 
its content and form. The manner in which an elected representative ought to behave in his or 
her role as a representative has been highly debated since the dawn of the representative 
system. In this chapter, we examine how candidates running for electoral positions perceive 
the roles of elected representatives, conceptualised as the focus and style of representation. 
We present an overview of role perceptions in different countries and analyse how the 
perceptions vary according to career paths, attributes of the candidates’ parties and the 
institutional setting of the electoral systems within which the candidates operate. We find that 
role perceptions are shaped by both patterns of socialisation and rational considerations 
created by the institutional context that surrounds politicians. 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine the perceptions that candidates have of their (potential) roles as 
political representatives and how these perceptions vary according to career paths, attributes of the 
candidates’ parties and the institutional settings of the electoral systems within which they operate. 
Roles of representation are at the very core of modern democracy (Eulau et al., 1959; Pitkin, 1967); 
they provide representative democracy with its content and form and can, as such, be regarded as 
a manifestation of the link between voters and representatives. The manner in which an elected 
representative ought to behave in his or her role has been highly debated since the dawn of the 
representative system. An early point of reference with a substantial impact on this debate is the 
oft-cited speech by Edmund Burke to the electors of Bristol in 1774. Burke, in his speech, 
advocates that members of parliament (MPs) should be unbound by instructions from the 
constituency and look after the common interest of the nation, rather than local or incompatible 
interests (Thomassen, 1994, p. 238; Judge, 1999, p. 53). As later noted by Eulau et al., (1959, p. 
744), Burke mixes what are considered as two different principles today, namely, which interests 
the representative ought to defend in cases of conflicting expectations, and what the representative 
should be bound by other than his or her conscience. These two questions are often referred to as 
the focus and style of representation. 
Empirical research on role perceptions suggests that politicians tend to offer different answers to 
the normative question of how elected representatives ought to act – depending on their individual 
characteristics and position within their respective parties, as well as the institutional settings that 
surround them (Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 2007; Wessels, 2007). These findings can be 
explained by not only socialisation patterns (Önnudóttir, 2016) but also rational responses to an 
incentive structure created by the political system (Wessels, 1999). 
In this chapter, we examine candidates’ role perceptions in a number of Western democracies with 
regard to whose interests a representative should further (focus of representation) and with what 
degree of independence the task should be carried out (style of representation). We also set out to 
analyse systematic patterns regarding variations in candidates’ role perceptions according to 
individual and party characteristics, as well as the incentive structure provided by the electoral 
system. Hitherto, most empirical studies on role perceptions have been single-country studies, 
focusing exclusively on MPs (Jenny and Müller, 2012). Our study, however, is based on data from 
the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS). These data enable us to include up to 7,112 candidates 
running for 84 parties in 13 different political systems, which involves a significantly larger pool 
of politicians from different countries than shown in previous studies on role perceptions. 
By expanding the scope of the general focus of studies in the field and including not only elected 
representatives but all candidates running for national elections, several advantages are gained. 
Candidates can be considered as active party members – reflecting a broader view of politicians, 
which is not limited to only those who are elected. The small n-problem is also resolved, with 
reliable advance testing of between-group variations between parties, different sociodemographic 
strata, contextual constellations or levels of party hierarchy. We acknowledge that once elected, 
candidates may not always be able to act fully in accordance with their representational preferences 
and that nonelected candidates might have a different view on how representation ought to work 
compared to incumbents. The preferences of candidates generally indicate their perception of the 
ideal representative process, while task definitions measured among MPs (Esaiasson, 2000) can 
be considered more as a self-evaluation of their work performance. 
We begin this chapter with a review of the literature on focus and style of representation before 
outlining the hypotheses that led to this present study. We then present our research design, 
including the data and operationalisation, and our empirical analyses before finishing off with 
concluding remarks. 
The focus and style of representation 
There are many different ways to classify roles of representation (Wahlke et al., 1962; Searing, 
1994; Rehfeld, 2009; Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012), partly reflecting a theoretical debate on 
how representation ought to be demonstrated under different circumstances. In a seminal study 
with substantial impact on subsequent empirical studies of representational roles, Eulau et al. 
(1959) make a distinction between the focus and the style of representation. The focus of 
representation is about which group the representatives consider themselves to represent, often 
divided into the constituency (or different sections of voters from the constituency) or the nation 
as a whole. The style of representation is, in turn, about what criterion the representatives ought to 
use when making decisions. The original classification of style includes trustees and voter 
delegates, where trustees base their decision on their own judgement, while voter delegates follow 
the will of the voters regardless of their own opinion. 
The focus and styles of representation can partly depend on each other. Those who are party 
delegates in style could be more likely to consider their party as their focus of representation. 
Trustees could be more likely to consider themselves as representatives of the nation as a whole, 
and voter delegates could be more likely to consider their constituency as their focus of 
representation. Even if styles and focus of representation can overlap to a certain extent, there is a 
difference. While the style of representation refers to what criterion representatives should base 
their decision-making on, the focus of representation refers to the group of people they consider 
themselves to represent – regardless of whether they are trustees, partisans or delegates. We, 
therefore, consider it relevant to analyse separately these two concepts, focus and styles of 
representation. 
The classical way of conceiving roles of representation in terms of style and focus departs from an 
individualistic perception of the representational process, which was developed in the US but fits 
poorly in a European context with strong parties. In later European studies, it therefore became 
common to supplement both the style and focus of representation with party-oriented categories. 
For the style of representation, this implies adding a party delegate role to the original classification 
of trustees and voter delegates. Examining representation in France, Converse and Pierce (1986) 
demonstrate that the party delegate style, together with the original two concepts of trustees and 
voter delegates, is better at capturing the practice of political representation. Rozenberg and 
Blomgren (2012) argue that this same three-fold classification is linked to both a normative and a 
philosophical debate on representation, with the major question being how elected representatives 
should make decisions in modern democracies. These three styles reflect the different sources 
representatives use, or claim to use, when making decisions as representatives, specifically when 
they are confronted with conflicting opinions or expectations. Within the framework of our study, 
we use this three-fold classification. 
The focus of representation is composed of various subjects and is defined quite coherently by 
various scholars. Eulau et al. (1959, p. 755) mention territories, parties, pressure groups or 
administrative organisations as units with which a representative may identify himself or herself. 
Eulau and Karps (1977, p. 248) locate three foci, namely, territories (nation, region, state, district 
or any other territorial level); religious, ethnic, economic and ideological groups; and individual 
persons who contact their MP when they need assistance with a particular case. Esaiasson (2000, 
p. 55) supplements the latter categorisation by adding party as a focus (Brack, Costa and Teixeira, 
2012, p. 387). It should be noted that the various foci are not necessarily mutually exclusive but 
can be held simultaneously (Eulau et al., 1959, p. 745). In this study, we chose to concentrate on 
the classical Burkean division between the two most commonly researched foci, the local and the 
national focus of representation, complemented by a partisan focus. 
Blomgren and Rozenberg (2012) argue that studies on representative roles became antiquated in 
the 1980s due to the decline in the use of representational roles as a concept in social science, lack 
of coherent findings and diffusion of how the concepts of roles were to be defined. This has, 
however, changed, and in the last two decades or so, a number of studies have been published on 
the topic (Esaiasson, 2000; Wessels, 2007; Brack et al., 2012; Önnudóttir, 2014; André, Bradbury 
and Depauw, 2015). Two likely reasons for the renewed interest are easier access to comparative 
data on the topic and the fact that recent empirical studies have contributed more consistent 
findings, creating a more robust theoretical, as well as empirical, platform for studies in the field. 
Additionally, in the recent wave of studies, scholars have been less interested in normative 
expectations concerning the superiority of certain roles (e.g., that delegates should be, de facto, 
closer to voters and represent them “better”) and more directed toward mapping, explaining and 
understanding variations in role perceptions. Many of these more recent studies of representational 
roles use distinctions, as described in the work of Eulau et al. (1959), as a basis for a more detailed 
view of role perceptions (Rehfeld, 2009). Regardless of the criticism directed toward the 
classification by Eulau et al., it appears as if it broaches core elements of democratic representation 
– that is, whom to represent and how. 
Explaining role perceptions 
Empirical research on roles of representation has attracted its fair share of attention, mainly 
focusing on elected representatives’ task definitions (Wahlke et al., 1962; Gunlicks, 1969; Gross, 
1978; Converse and Pierce, 1979; Studlar and McAllister, 1996; Katz, 1997; Esaiasson, 2000). 
Several scholars have also devoted attention to how institutions and the electoral context shape the 
representative process (Costa et al., 2012). This approach often departs from a rational choice 
perspective and assumes that the roles representatives adopt are strategic choices based on a 
calculus of what helps them to reach their goals, whether that is to get selected or elected (Strøm, 
2012). 
Many studies confirm that role perceptions and the behaviour of representatives are shaped by the 
incentive structure provided by the electoral institutions via candidate selection, district magnitude 
and ballot structure (Lancaster, 1986; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Crisp et al., 2004; Wessels, 2007). 
Parties are considered as key actors via their role as gatekeepers in control of candidate selection. 
The more power the party holds over candidate selection and the more dependent candidates are 
on the party for election, the more likely the candidates are to be party delegates (Wessels and 
Giebler, 2011; Zittel, 2012; Önnudóttir, 2016) and, hence, perceive the party as their main principal 
(compared to the voters or the district). The incentive structure is also shaped by the size of the 
constituency and the ballot structure, where representatives in single-member districts or in 
proportional electoral systems with open or flexible ballots tend to be more constituency-oriented 
than others (Valen et al., 2000; Shugart et al., 2005; Pilet, Freire and Costa, 2012; von Schoultz 
and Wass, 2016). 
Other scholars have emphasised that role perceptions are shaped by socialisation processes 
(Önnudóttir, 2016) – where personal experiences, as well as cultural factors, vary across countries 
and parties. Önnudóttir (2016) points to effects across office- versus policy-seeking parties, where 
the trustee style is more common in the former. Furthermore, she demonstrates notable differences 
in styles of representation across countries and party types. Irish MPs are, for example, more likely 
to follow the party line and emphasise the party delegate role, while German and Icelandic 
candidates tend to perceive themselves as trustees. The voter delegate style, in turn, is more 
common in Eastern Europe, and it is especially pronounced among nationalistic populist parties. 
These tendencies indicate that there are, indeed, differences in styles of representation across 
countries, political systems and party types, but less is known about why these differences exist. 
Departing from previous research, we will outline a set of hypotheses to be tested in the empirical 
section. When it comes to the focus of representation, we consider three different factors that we 
expect will shape the way politicians define their task: party type, district magnitude and ballot 
structure. For party types, it can be considered that niche parties or parties that focus on specific 
segments of voters or claim to represent specific groups – such as regional parties, ethnic parties 
and even agrarian parties – are more likely to promote a local focus among their candidates. The 
reasoning is that these parties have a history of campaigning on specific issues, one that is often 
tied to a specific area or a particular group with a geographical locus. 
For district magnitude and ballot structures that are of systemic nature and hence shared by all 
candidates running for electoral positions in a specific country or constituency, previous research 
has demonstrated that smaller district magnitude (Wessels, 1999) and more open ballot structures 
(Farrell and Scully, 2010) increase the likelihood for MPs to focus on their constituency. 
Consistent with this finding, Zittel (2012) observes that candidates running in single-member 
districts in Germany and candidates with better chances of winning are more likely to focus on the 
district. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that Nordic MPs from peripheral constituencies, 
which are often small MP districts, are more prone to promote geographical interests (Valen et al., 
2000). 
Two mechanisms are likely to drive the finding that smaller district magnitude encourages a 
constituency focus. First, settings with fewer available representatives (and, hence, less diversity) 
focus more on the individual representative (or representatives) rather than on the party or the 
various groups that these few (or single) candidates represent. This, in turn, is likely to push the 
campaign toward issues that unite a larger number of voters from the constituency rather than 
attract only certain subsections of constituency voters. Second, it is likely that when district 
magnitude is low, politicians are more accustomed to view constituency service as part of the 
representative task. This is because relatively few representatives are available and there is an 
electoral incentive for politicians to focus on their constituency. 
The open ballot structure encourages candidates to focus on their district since such focus can help 
them get (re)elected. Open lists come with high levels of intra-party competition, which provides 
candidates with a strong incentive to attract personal followers rather than cultivate the reputation 
of the party (Carey and Shugart, 1995). These personal followers are often recruited based on a 
local connection related to the idea of candidates as agents of local interests, knowing the area and 
its interests (Shugart et al., 2005). Regarding the focus of representation, we developed the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: Party types: Candidates of regional parties (including agrarian parties) and ethnic parties 
are more likely to consider themselves representatives of their districts. 
H2: Electoral system: Under a lower district magnitude, candidates are more likely to 
consider themselves as representatives of their districts and less likely to consider 
themselves as representatives of their parties or the nation as a whole. 
H3: Electoral system: Under the open ballot structure, candidates are more likely to consider 
themselves as representatives of their district and less likely to consider themselves as 
representatives of their parties or the nation as a whole. 
When it comes to the styles of representation, previous research points toward the effects of 
socialisation, working through career paths and ties to the party. The impact of socialisation can 
take various forms – depending on, among other things, the structure of the selection process and 
the status of candidates within his or her party at different time periods. The factors we consider 
in our analyses are whether the candidates have been elected as MPs (incumbency) and the length 
of party membership – both of which, we argue, lead to socialisation effects based on different 
types of mechanisms. For the length of party membership, we suggest this would promote the party 
delegate style since it is likely to enhance feelings of loyalty toward the party and fellow party 
members. However, once incumbents, we hypothesise that representatives are more likely to adopt 
a trustee style since this position is likely to promote expertise and political self-confidence to act 
in a more independent way. Furthermore, a greater tendency for MPs to act as independent trustees 
can also be due to a greater room for manoeuvre created by electoral security and the perception 
that an MP is considered more valuable to the party than an unelected candidate. These two 
arguments, that the length of party membership promotes the party delegate style and that 
incumbency promotes the trustee style, do not have to be in contradiction in the sense that they 
cancel each other out. Rather, the arguments reflect the importance of where in his or her career 
each politician is situated. 
For the effect of the electoral system, we again find it plausible that the ballot structure and district 
magnitude matter in deciding the style of representation that politicians adhere to. A closed party 
ballot structure, with no chance for candidates to either move up or down on the list, places 
candidates’ electoral fortunes in the hands of the party and causes a rational candidate to consider 
the party as his or her main principal. It is, therefore, likely that closed lists promote the party 
delegate style. Higher district magnitude, in turn, endorses diversity and points to a greater 
campaign focus on different parties and less on a few individual candidates. A high district 
magnitude is, therefore, likely to promote the party delegate style, whereas a low one would 
promote either the voter delegate or the trustee style. Regarding styles of representation, we 
developed the following hypotheses: 
H4: Socialisation: Incumbents are more likely to be trustees and less likely to be voter or 
party delegates. 
H5: Socialisation: The longer candidates have been party members, the more likely they are 
to be party delegates. 
H6: Electoral system: Under a more closed ballot structure, candidates are more likely to be 
party delegates and less likely to be trustees or voter delegates. 
H7: Electoral system: Under a high district magnitude, candidates are more likely to consider 
themselves as party delegates and less likely to be voter delegates and trustees. 
 
Research design, data and analysis 
Response variables: focus and styles of representation 
To outline role perceptions across countries and test our formulated hypotheses, we used data from 
the CCS. Our response variables measured two constructs: focus and styles of representation. 
Regarding focus of representation, candidates were asked to rank different groups that an elected 
member of parliament should represent. The question posed was the following: There are different 
opinions about whom an elected member of parliament should primarily represent. What is your 
opinion? The different foci included were: 
• own voters in the constituency/own party voters in the constituency; 
• all citizens in the constituency; 
• the party electorate at large; 
• members of a social group; and  
• the (country) citizenry; 
For focus of representation, we created a variable with four different categories representing the 
focus that candidates give the highest priority: local (all constituency options), party (national), the 
nation (citizenry) and interest groups. These four categories constituted four dummy variables: 
those who rank each group as no. 1 (1) or not (0). Because of the low popularity of the interest 
group focus, we chose to exclude it from the empirical analysis. It is noted that those candidates 
coded as having a local or a constituency-level focus are both candidates who said that they should 
primarily represent their own voters or their own party voters in their constituency1 and those who 
said that they should represent all citizens in the constituency. This means that the local focus can 
also include a party focus, but it is a party focus within a certain region, and for that reason, we 
consider it meaningful to categorise it as a local focus, regardless of whether that is a focus on all 
or some of their constituents. An overview of the proportion of candidates in each country that 
claims each focus can be seen in Table 6.1, which shows which countries and elections were 
included in our models for focus of representation. 
It is notable that the national party focus is the least common focus candidates report, at least as 
we have classified focus of representation. In the Netherlands, half of the candidates hold a national 
party focus, but the proportions are much smaller in other countries. The main contrast seems to 
be between a local focus (including a local party focus) and a national citizen focus. The four 
countries that rank highest on the national citizen focus are Greece, Iceland, Italy and Portugal; 
those that rank highest on the local focus are Australia, Canada, Ireland and Norway. Explanations 
for those differences are suggested here. In the case of Ireland and Canada, the strong emphasis on 
the local focus could be due to a low district magnitude. This does not, however, explain the high 
rankings of the local focus in Norway and Australia because these countries have, on average, a 
higher district magnitude. The differences between countries could also be due to the differences 
in political culture and political discourses. It should also be noted that the percentages in Table 
6.1 do not indicate whether there are differences across parties 
Table 6.1 Candidates’ focus of representation per country and election 
Election Local 
focus/constituency 








Australia 2007 64.9 8.1 26.7 0.2 445 
Canada 2008 68.6 1.6 29.7 0.0 306 
Greece 2007 36.4 1.1 59.9 2.7 187 
Finland 2011 42.4 6.9 46.6 4.1 875 
Iceland 2009 28.8 0.0 68.5 2.6 267 
Ireland 2007 75.9 3.5 19.4 1.2 170 
Italy 2013 25.2 14.0 58.6 2.2 587 
Netherlands 2006 8.1 51.6 37.3 3.1 161 
Norway 2009 77.3 3.5 18.6 0.5 958 
Portugal 2009 38.7 5.0 55.8 0.5 199 
Portugal 2011 40.6 2.2 55.6 1.7 180 
aInto local focus are combined those who either focus on own/own party voters or all citizens in the constituency. 
For styles of representation, we use the question: How should a member of parliament vote in 
parliament if … 
(a) the voters in his/her constituency have one opinion and his/her party takes a different position? 
(vote according to the party’s opinion/vote according to the voters’ opinion); 
(b) if his/her own opinion on an issue does not correspond with the opinion of the voters in his/her 
constituency? (vote according to his or her own opinion/vote according to the voters’ opinion); 
and  
(c) if his/her own opinion on an issue does not correspond with his/her party’s position? (vote 
according to his or her own opinion/vote according to the party’s opinion). 
These items were recoded into three different categories: those who responded “the voters’ 
opinion” in items (a) and (b) were classified as voter delegates, those who responded “the party’s 
opinion” in items (a) and (c) were classified as party delegates and those who responded “the MP’s 
own opinion” in items (b) and (c) were classified as trustees. Table 6.2 provides an overview of 
the classification for each of the countries and elections included in our models for styles of 
representation. The approach we applied resulted in a very low proportion of non-classifiable 
candidates – respondents who chose “the party’s opinion” in item (a), “the voters’ opinion” in item 
(b) and “the MP’s own opinion” in item (c). 
The variances between different styles of representation are much greater compared to the focus 
of representation (in which candidates of different countries mainly emphasised one type of focus). 
However, in no country or election does the majority of candidates promote the voter delegate 
style; rather, the contrast seems to be more between the party delegate style and the trustee style. 
Again, there are some notable country differences. For example, the party delegate style is the 
most popular one among Irish and Norwegian candidates, while the trustee style is the most 
popular one among candidates in Iceland and Switzerland. 
 
Table 6.2 Style of representation and elections 









Australia 2007 28.7 36.9 30.6 3.7 428 
Denmark 2011 34.1 4.8 57.5 3.7 273 
Finland 2011 13.5 24.5 54.3 7.7 871 
Greece 2007 36.3 23.1 33.5 7.1 182 
Iceland 2009 12.0 19.1 65.2 3.7 325 
Ireland 2007 51.0 22.9 22.2 3.9 153 
Italy 2013 25.8 33.5 35.7 4.9 647 
Netherlands 2006 46.7 5.3 44.7 3.3 152 
Norway 2009 52.4 17.6 23.4 6.5 964 
Portugal 2009 24.5 30.2 38.0 7.3 192 
Portugal 2011 21.7 35.8 37.2 5.3 226 
Switzerland 2007 13.0 15.9 61.8 9.2 1,411 
Switzerland 2011 9.9 19.3 67.4 3.5 1,288 
Explanatory variables 
In our models, we tested the impact of district magnitude2 and ballot structure3 on both the focus 
and the styles of representation. In addition, we tested the impact of party type on focus of 
representation and career path socialisation (incumbency)4 and party socialisation (years of party 
membership)5 on styles of representation. District magnitude was a continuous variable, which 
varied from 1 (single-member districts) to 150. Ballot structure was coded into two dummy 
variables, using open ballot structure as the reference group and contrasting it with a closed party 
ballot structure and medium or weak preference ballots. Party types were based on the 
classification of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Nationalistic parties were 
contrasted with other party types (ecology parties, left-wing parties, liberal parties, right-wing 
parties, regional/ethnic/agrarian parties and other party types). For incumbency, we contrasted 
those who were or have been incumbents and years of party membership on a continuous scale. 
Control variables 
We controlled for various other variables that have been found to impact focus and style of 
representation – candidates’ left-right self-placement, left-right distance between candidates and 
their parties and candidates’ perceived chances of winning and gender (Wahlke et al., 1962; 
Davidson, 1969; Bell and Price, 1975; Brack et al., 2012; Zittel, 2012). These were drawn from 
the CCS data. 
Analysis 
Given the structure of our hypotheses and data, we needed to apply a multilevel model technique. 
It could be argued that a four- or five-level model is appropriate because the data are structured 
with individual candidates nested within parties, nested within districts, nested within elections 
and nested within countries. We will, however, opt for a simpler model, using three levels, in 
which we consider that candidates are nested within parties and elections, and here we present 
each in turn. Table 6.3 gives an overview of the intra-class correlations of several null models. As 
can be observed when using a two-level model, the one with individuals nested within parties 
always explains more of the variance of the response variable than the other two-level models. It 
can also be observed that in three-level models, with candidates nested within parties and elections, 
both the country and the party levels explain much of the variance, with the party level always 
explaining more. Thus, we are confident that a three-level model, with individuals, party and 





Table 6.3 Intra-class correlations of the null models 
 Intra-class correlation Intra-class correlation 













Focus of representation 
      
Local 0.27 0.25 0.20 0.32 0.30 0.26 
Party  0.43 0.42 0.26 0.54 0.47 0.41 
National 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.14 
Style of representation 
      
Party delegate 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.24 0.23 0.14 
Voter delegate 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.16 0.10 
Trustee 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.10 
  
We ran six multilevel models altogether, with three levels (individual candidates nested within 
parties that are nested within countries). The first three models (Table 6.4) analyse the focus of 
representation divided into a local focus, a party focus and a national focus. These are followed by 
three models for styles of representation (Table 6.5): one for the party delegate style, one for the 
voter delegate style and one for the trustee style. 
As shown in Table 6.4, our results for the effects of focus of representation are mixed, but all of 
our outlined hypotheses gained some support. The first hypothesis (H1), which states that 
candidates of regional/ethnic/agrarian parties are more likely to have a local focus, is supported, 
at least when those are contrasted with candidates of nationalistic parties. Our second hypothesis 
(H2), which states that under a lower district magnitude, candidates are more likely to consider 
themselves as representatives of their district and less likely to consider themselves as 
representatives of their party or the nation as a whole, is also partly supported. A high district 
magnitude appears to promote a partisan focus, while its impact on local and national focus is 
negligible. The third hypothesis (H3) is also partly supported. Open ballots are more likely to 
promote a local focus, compared to weak preference ballots. However, ballot structure seems to 






Table 6.4 Focus of representation (multilevel models) 
Response variables focus of 
representation Null model 
Local  
coef. 
(std.err.) Null model 
Party  
coef.  





–0.15 –0.03 –3.28*** –2.70** –0.37 –0.34 
(0.307) (0.495) (0.488) (0.834) (0.226) (0.500) 
Individual-level variables       
Left-right distance between candidate 
and his/her party 
 –0.03  –0.07  0.03 
 (0.040)  (0.083)  (0.040) 
Left-right self-placement 
 0.06*  –0.05  –0.03 
 (0.025)  (0.049)  (0.024) 
Chances of winning (1=could not 
win, 5=could not lose) 
 –0.01  –0.12  0.05 
 (0.042)  (0.081)  (0.040) 
Is or has been an incumbent 
 –0.28*  0.12  0.19 
 (0.139)  (0.283)  (0.136) 
Years of party membership 
 0.01  –0.01  –0.003 
 (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.004) 
Female 
 0.12  0.11  –0.15+ 
 (0.087)  (0.170)  (0.086) 
Party-level variables       
Party type (ref. group: nationalistic parties)     
Ecology parties 
 –0.17  0.69  –0.31 
 (0.451)  (0.832)  (0.445) 
Left-wing parties 
 0.22  –0.40  –0.37 
 (0.386)  (0.797)  (0.387) 
Liberal parties 
 0.18  –0.86  –0.17 
 (0.399)  (0.834)  (0.398) 
Right-wing parties 
 0.28  –0.42  –0.30 
 (0.384)  (0.790)  (0.382) 
Regional, ethnic, agrarian parties 
  0.96*  –0.32  –1.12* 
 (0.446)  (0.885)  (0.457) 
Other party types 
 0.22  –0.15  –0.32 
 (0.453)  (0.893)  (0.444) 
Election-level variables            
District magnitude 
 –0.004  0.02**  –0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
Ballot structure (ref. group: strong preference or candidate ballot)     
Party ballot 
 –0.66  –0.19  0.69 
 (0.427)  (0.423)  (0.437) 
Weak or medium preference ballot 
 –2.36**  0.54  0.29 
 (0.894)  (0.986)  (0.868) 




























AIC 3,636.508 3,628.272 1,256.324 1,250.899 3,698.518 3,703.487 
BIC 3,654.527 3,736.387 1,274.343 1,359.014 3,716.537 3,811.602 
Observations: 3,000. Parties: 61. Elections: 11. 










Moving on to the analysis of the styles of representation (Table 6.5), we find support (full or partly) 
for all of our outlined hypotheses concerning the impact of socialisation and the structure of the 
electoral system. Regarding socialisation, we hypothesised that incumbents are more likely to be 
trustees (career path socialisation) and less likely to be voter or party delegates (H4), and that years 
of party membership (party socialisation) promotes the party delegate style (H5). Regarding the 
electoral system, we hypothesised that the closed ballot structure promotes the party delegate styles 
and makes candidates less likely to be trustees or voter delegates (H6) and that a high district 
magnitude makes candidates more likely to be party delegates and less likely to be voter delegates 
or trustees (H7). Under open ballots, candidates were more likely to promote a voter delegate style 
when contrasted with weak or medium preferential ballots. In the case of incumbency, those who 
were or who have been incumbents were more likely to promote the trustee style and less likely to 
be voter delegates. Incumbency does, however, have a negligible impact on the party delegate 
style. Years of party membership promotes the party delegate style, whereas the ballot structure 
does not seem to be related to any of the styles of representation. In line with our hypothesis, we 
found that candidates under a high district magnitude were more likely to be party delegates and 
less likely to be voter delegates, while district magnitude had a negligible relation with the trustee 
style. 
Even if we did not present hypotheses about the impacts of party types and only controlled for 
those in our models about styles of representation, it is notable that they do seem to have some 
impact. Here we highlight that in the case of ecology parties, candidates are less likely to emphasise 
the party delegate and voter delegate styles, and more likely to emphasise the trustee style. This 
could be due to those parties being more likely to promote policies under which candidates 
consider that elected representatives are granted a mandate to use their own judgement for the sake 
of the environment, meaning that they promote themselves as experts on environmental policies 
and consider that voters have granted them a mandate to make decisions based on their own 
expertise. Whether this is the case is an open question but a clear avenue for future research. 
  
Table 6.5 Styles of representation (multilevel models) 



















Constant –0.97*** –0.89+ –1.64*** –0.37 –.26 –1.10* 
(0.237) (0.481) (0.195) (0.366) (.202) (0.458) 
Individual-level variables             
Left-right distance between 
candidate and his/her party 
  –0.14***   0.04   0.08** 
 
(0.039)   (0.039)   (0.032) 
Left-right self-placement   –0.03   –0.01   0.03  
(0.025)   (0.023)   (0.021) 
Chances of winning (1 = could 
not win, 5 = could not lose) 
  0.07+   –0.13**   0.02 
 
(0.038)   (0.044)   (0.035) 
Is or has been an incumbent   –0.11   –0.51**   0.43***  
(0.130)   (0.162)   (0.118) 
Years of party membership   0.02***   –0.01**   –0.003  
(0.004)   (0.004)   (0.003) 
Female   –0.08   0.28**   –0.18**  
(0.080)   (0.084)   (0.068) 
Party-level variables             
Party type (ref. gr.: nationalistic parties)          
Ecology parties   –1.08**   –1.13***   1.42*** 
  (0.404)   (0.306)   (0.375) 
Left-wing parties   –0.28   –0.81**   0.53  
(0.354)   (0.230)   (0.337) 
Liberal parties   –0.55   –0.61*   0.68+  
(0.373)   (0.279)   (0.353) 
Right-wing parties   –0.48   –0.34   0.42  
(0.335)   (0.249)   (0.321) 
Regional, ethnic, agrarian 
parties 
  –0.41   –0.98*   0.69  
(0.484)   (0.385)   (0.464) 
Other party types   –0.45   0.04   –0.10  
(0.413)   (0.310)   (0.395) 
Election-level variables             
District magnitude 
 
0.01***   –0.01**   –0.00002 
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Ballot structure (ref. gr. strong preference or candidate ballot)  
  
        
Party ballot 
 
–0.08   0.34   –0.05 
  (0.489)   (0.318)   (0.471) 
Weak or medium preference 
ballot 
  –0.23   –1.04*   0.49 
  (0.674)   (0.505)   (0.644) 
Random effects parameters, 
estimate (Std. err) 
            
Elections (constant) 0.79 
(0.179) 
0.74 (.171) 0.63 
(.156) 
0.46 (.131) 0.66 
(.159) 
0.71 (168) 
Parties (constant) 0.61 
(0.076) 
0.53 (0.071) 0.49 
(0.074) 
0.32 (0.069) 0.62 
(0.074) 
0.52 (0.067) 
AIC 4,839.825 4,799.145 4,399.42 4,303.16 6,084.699 6,054.379 
BIC 4,859.309 4,916.051 4,418.904 4,420.065 6,104.183 6,171.284 
Observations: 4,889. Parties: 84. Elections: 13. 
*










In this chapter, we have established that there are differences in how candidates perceive their roles 
as representatives (elected or not). Dividing roles of representation into focus and styles of 
representation, we found considerable differences across and within countries. Our analyses 
demonstrate that some of these differences can be explained by socialisation factors and the 
incentive structure within which candidates operate. 
Our findings for the focus of representation – which relates which group candidates prioritise as 
the most important one to represent and is divided into a local, partisan and national focus – are 
mixed. Party types seem to matter; candidates of regional/ethnic/agrarian parties are more likely 
to emphasise a local focus and less likely to emphasise a national one when compared with 
candidates of nationalistic parties. This could indicate that those types of parties (regional, ethnic 
and agrarian) are more used to campaigning on and emphasising specific policy issues related to 
subgroups of voters with a specific geographical base. We acknowledge that the agrarian party 
type might be considered an outdated category and that parties that have been categorised as 
agrarian parties in the CSES data are considered former agrarian parties. However, we argue that 
the history of these parties, as advocates for rural areas and farmers, is likely to have spurred a 
party culture that emphasises the importance of local interests and representation. 
Regarding district magnitude, we hypothesised that a candidate nominated in a small member 
district (i.e., low district magnitude) is more likely to hold a local focus and less likely to promote 
a party focus or a national focus. The effects, however, are negligible and statistically insignificant. 
We did, however, discover that high district magnitude promotes a partisan focus, which can be 
seen as the opposite side of the coin. Large districts elect more representatives, which, in turn, 
allows greater room for diversity and ideological differences and is likely to stimulate a role 
perception that departs from the party focus, rather than the local or national focus. 
Concerning the ballot structure, we tested whether candidates were more likely to consider 
themselves as representatives of their districts under open ballots – that is, in the context where 
preferential voting and personal vote-earning behaviour among candidates is more prevalent. Our 
findings in this regard were mixed. We did find that strong preferential voting promotes a local 
focus (as hypothesised) but only when contrasted with medium or weak preferential voting and 
not when contrasted with a closed ballot structure (but the direction was as expected). However, it 
is not surprising that electoral systems with strong preferential voting promote a local focus 
compared to weak or medium preferential voting (so-called flexible lists). Open lists create strong 
incentives for candidates to run a personalised campaign, and within open-list systems, there is 
usually a high level of intra-party competition (Carey and Shugart, 1995). It is well known that 
voters under such systems use local attributes – i.e., attributes that signal that the candidate “knows 
the area and its interests” (Shugart et al., 2005) – as information shortcuts when deciding which 
candidates to support, and that most candidates campaign and win large shares of their votes on 
their “home turf” (von Schoultz, 2018). Such voter behaviour and campaigning efforts are likely 
to inspire a localised role perception. 
Regarding styles of representation – divided into party delegates, voter delegates and trustees – we 
found effects related to socialisation and the electoral system that, to a large extent, are consistent 
with our formulated hypotheses. Our analyses show that incumbent MPs are more likely to adhere 
to a trustee style and less likely to adopt a voter delegate style. A longer period as a party member, 
in turn, promotes the partisan style and discourages the voter delegate style. Furthermore, when 
district magnitude is high, candidates are more likely to be party delegates and less likely to be 
voter delegates. 
Serving as an incumbent MP involves gaining valuable experience from various types of decision-
making processes – including coalition building and compromising, processes in which it is likely 
that personal judgement, experience and expertise are valuable aspects – and where it can be 
difficult to act as a disciplined voter or party delegate. The finding that incumbent MPs are more 
likely to adhere to a trustee style and less likely to emphasise a voter delegate style is, therefore, 
not very surprising. Furthermore, incumbents could be more likely to campaign with their past 
performance as incumbents, providing them with incentives to promote that they can be trusted in 
the future to make right and just decisions. In contrast to this, new candidates and candidates who 
do not have the experience of an incumbent could be more likely to promote a voter delegate style, 
and here we suggest two reasons. First, those nonelected candidates who aspire to incumbency 
could consider a voter delegate style to be the most appropriate to promote as a strategy to convince 
voters that they would work on their behalf. Second, in public discussions, it is often emphasised 
that MPs should act according to the will of voters, even if this will is often unclear, and even 
though in very few cases, when it comes to politics, there is such a thing as common general will. 
Thus, the emphasis among nonelected candidates on the voter delegate role could reflect a popular 
public discourse, rather than a well-reasoned role perception based on experience. 
When it comes to the effect of length of party membership, we argue that this is due to party 
socialisation, and the longer one has been a member, the more likely one is to emphasise a party 
delegate role, which is what we observed, and the less likely one is to promote a voter delegate 
role. These findings are not surprising given that years of party membership could indicate that 
candidates do agree with, and have even taken part in, forming their respective parties’ policies. 
Moreover, it is likely that they have taken part in their parties’ activities together with their 
respective party members for a long time, further strengthening their view that it is their respective 
parties’ policy that should be decisive, as opposed to the will of voters. 
In the case of ballot structure, our finding that open ballots make candidates more likely to 
emphasise a voter delegate style is, in our view, based on similar mechanisms as for the focus of 
representation – that is, strong preferential voting incentivises candidates to promote a local focus 
and simultaneously promote the will of their voters (e.g., local voters). Again, we expect that the 
lack of a statistically significant difference between open and closed ballots is caused by a lack of 
data (too few elections in the different categories). 
Finally, we found that candidates from areas with high district magnitude are more likely to 
emphasise a party delegate role and less likely to emphasise a voter delegate role. This result points 
to the importance of the role of party organisations in campaigning, for example. When district 
magnitude is high, campaigns are more likely to be controlled by the party organisation and carried 
out as a joint effort of the candidates of the party. This can incentivise candidates to adhere to a 
party delegate style in order to further their interests and secure a seat high on the list. In low 
magnitude districts, however, the voters’ party choice is likely to be intertwined with, and 
influenced by, perceptions of the nominated candidates – which provides candidates with dual 
principals, the party and the voters, and stronger incentives to prioritise the will of the voters from 
whom they receive their mandate (i.e., the voters of their district). 
The roles of representation are at the heart of democracy. The roles of representation that 
politicians adopt provide representative democracy with its content and form and manifest the link 
between voters and their representatives. The manner in which an elected representative ought to 
behave in his or her role as an elected representative is highly debated and has been ever since the 
dawn of the representative system. As has become apparent from the empirical endeavours of this 
chapter, no agreement regarding how an ideal representative ought to behave is in sight. In our 
analyses, we have found that candidates’ role perceptions vary according to career paths, attributes 
of their parties and the institutional settings of the electoral systems within which they operate. 
Although patterns are not always straightforward, it appears as if candidates’ role perceptions, the 
style and the focus to which they adhere, are influenced both by patterns of socialisation and 
rational considerations created by the institutional context that surrounds them. This central 
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1Candidates running in single-members districts were asked whether they should primarily represent own voters in 
the constituency, whereas candidates running on party lists were asked whether they should primarily represent own 
party voters in the constituency. 
2We consulted various sources for information on district magnitude: election resources on the Internet 
(www.electionresources.org), the Comparative Political Data Set 2015, the Constituency-Level Elections Archive 
and, in the case of the Netherlands and Canada, information on their electoral system, with only one constituency in 
the former country and all constituencies as single-member districts in Canada. 
3Information on ballot structure was retrieved from the Ace Project (www.aceproject.org) and the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (www.ipu.org). 
4Retrieved from the CCS data. 
5Retrieved from the CCS data. 
                                                 
